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Abstract 
The main purpose of this paper is to assess intra-regional trade within the CIS 
by looking at the impact of numerous trade agreements in the region. 
Applying a gravity model on a set of 162 countries, we attempt to assess 
dynamics of intra-regional trade of various trade agreements between 1995 
and 2008 in order to identify trade creation and trade diversion effects. We 
propose and empirically test three explanations of the CIS intra-regional 
trade: 1) home bias effect, 2) holding together effect and 3) holdup effect. 
Finally, we perform a simulation of potential trade and see to what extent 
twelve post-Soviet states and all their groupings would, ceteris paribus, have 
traded with each other.  
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I. Introduction 
The Soviet Union had been a highly integrated state of 15 republics with uniform 
infrastructure, technology and other determinants of trade. After the dissolution of the USSR, 
all countries went through severe structural shocks and deep economic crises. It took a decade 
for the former Soviet Union countries to become integrated into the world economy and 
trading system. While three of the former Soviet republics have now joined the European Union 
(EU), other twelve countries are still struggling on their own to adjust their economies to the 
changing economic conditions and terms of trade. A year after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus initiated the first cooperation agreement that was later 
supported by the other nine countries. Since the creation of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), numerous agreements have been signed concerning trade, 
investments and other tenets of economic cooperation. In 1996 Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
signed a Customs Union agreement that became a core of the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEC-5), which was created in 2000 including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2003, an attempt 
to establish a four-country2 Common Economic Space (CES) has been launched, however, did 
not succeed.   
Despite all these formal efforts, trade ties between the CIS countries have been rapidly 
digressing. From 1995 to 2009 the share of intra-regional trade as a percent of total trade of 
the CIS countries shrank from 30% to 16%. The most dramatic decline of 58% occurred in intra-
regional trade among landlocked Central Asian countries3.  At present, the CIS is a home for 
dozens of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements within and outside the region. In most 
cases they are not operational. The most recent integration attempt is a Russia-Belarus-
Kazakhstan Customs Union (EurAsEC-3), launched in 2010, which has been followed by real 
policy changes, the adoption of unified tariff rate, and rapid progress toward deeper 
integration. 
This paper makes an assessment of the relative impact of main multilateral trade 
agreements and groupings in the CIS.  Applying a gravity model on a sample set of 162 
countries covering the period between 1995 and 2008, we attempt to assess dynamics of intra-
regional trade in the region and explain it from the viewpoint of three main hypotheses: home 
bias effect, holding together regionalism and holdup effect.  Finally, we perform a simulation of 
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potential trade and evaluate to what extent the CIS and all its groupings overtrade or 
undertrade with each other and the world.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides a brief literature survey, Section III 
discusses the comparative advantages of the regions and their changing trade patterns, Section 
IV applies a gravity model to quantify the effect of regional trade agreements, Section V 
estimates trade potentials and, finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. Stylized Facts on Trade of the Former Soviet Union States 
A conventional method of empirical assessment of regional trade agreements uses a 
gravity modeling approach, which allows conducting econometric estimation of bilateral trade 
flows and assessing the impact of dummy variables. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
there have been numerous studies discussing various aspects of disintegration and re-
integration.  Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash (1998) documented the increase of trade openness at 
the initial stages of transition process in the former USSR countries, which indicated that the 
countries closer to the EU are more successful. However, Elborgh-Woytek (2003) found that 
openness has been falling since 1997 and will likely increase if market-oriented reforms were 
pursued more vigorously. Djankov and Freund (2000) explained home bias within Russia by 
imposition of high external tariffs and past linkages such as infrastructure, business networks 
and production chains. Freinkman et al (2004) concluded that the process of trade 
diversification away from the CIS remains incomplete in the CIS-7, and progress in the trade 
area was slower in the low-income CIS countries than in the high-income CIS members. De 
Sousa and Lamotte (2007) found a reduction of home bias within the former Soviet Union, 
former Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia from 1993 to 2001, which happened due to the 
transition process that had a different impact on the countries.  By looking at disaggregated 
data, Shelburne and Pidufala (2006) concluded that over the past decade the CIS countries have 
significantly diversified their geographical destinations for exports of natural resources and raw 
materials but have been less successful in terms of promoting their manufactured goods. Most 
of the CIS countries under-rely on other CIS countries for their imports of manufactured goods 
but over-rely on them as a destination for their manufactured exports. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 
(2000) found that the former Soviet countries overtrade almost 43 times above the potential.  
Freinkman et al (2004) found that the five Central Asian countries and Moldova still overtrade 
with the CIS and undertrade with the rest of the world. Shepotylo (2009) estimated the 
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potential trade using disaggregated trade data and found a disproportionally larger share of 
resource extraction oriented trade within the CIS countries. 
Separate studies on Central Asia focus mostly on the landlocked nature of those 
countries. For instance, Raballand (2003) assessed a negative impact of the landlockedness and 
found that the number of border crossings along with long distance was crucial to explaining 
the level of trade flows. Grigorou (2007) and Carrere and Grigorou (2008) looked at the three 
factors that matter for the region: overland transportation costs, bargaining power with transit 
countries and the infrastructure of the latter. Moreover, of these three components, only the 
transit countries’ infrastructure is specific to Central Asia: improvements in infrastructure of the 
transit-country raise trade three times more for Central Asian countries than for other 
landlocked countries. Grafe et al (2005) suggested that not only borders but also the trade 
barriers beyond the border are significant obstacles for market integration both within the 
countries and within Central Asia. ADB (2006) pointed to more significant trade barriers 
pertaining to trade policy in Central Asia: 1) relatively high tariffs with a complex tariff schedule; 
2) frequent and unpredictable changes in the tariff schedule; 3) high implicit tariffs in the form 
of taxes that are levied on imported goods but not on domestically produced goods, or have 
higher rates for imported goods  than for domestically produced goods; 4) explicit export taxes; 
and 5) prohibition and licensing of exports and imports of certain commodities, as well as large 
agricultural subsidies. According to the trade theory, a country’s integration with a certain 
regional economic block can lead to an increasing convergence of trade structures and, thus, to 
the development of intra-industry trade. However, in regards to Central Asia, Kurmanalieva and 
Parpiev (2008) provided results of Helpman test and showed a disappointingly low degree of 
intra-industry and intra-regional trade for five landlocked countries in the CIS. Libman (2008) 
provides a firm-centered perspective on the regional integration and indentifies few important 
trends on regional integration. For instance, he suggested that recent economic success of 
Kazakhstan created all necessary conditions for the country to become an important center for 
development of regional multinationals and FDI, as well as act as a center of attraction for labor 
migration. Felipe and Kumar (2009) estimated the gains in trade derived from improvements in 
trade facilitation using the World Bank’s Logistic Performance Index (LPI) and found significant 
gains that vary from 28% for Azerbaijan to 63% for Tajikistan.  
Facilitating regional cooperation between landlocked and transit countries in order to 
upgrade the transit infrastructure should thus be a policy priority for governments and 
international institutions. Russia’s position remains crucial for trade-related developments in 
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the CIS region. However, the CIS countries are reluctant to commit themselves to ‘hard’ 
arrangements and remain wary of Russia’s dominance, while Russia itself seems to dissociate 
itself from its partners (De Kort and Dragneva, 2006). However, the emergence of new 
initiatives for cooperation indicates that the CIS countries seem to realize existence of gains 
from regional cooperation.  
There is a number of country studies that discuss pros and cons of the WTO accession. 
Lissovolik and Lissovolik (2006) assessed an ‘outsider’ status of Russia in the WTO, and suggest 
that the WTO membership would help the country to address an underlying bias in its trade, 
and would make the WTO nearly universal, thereby possibly giving a multilateral boost to global 
trade. In addition, Stern (2002) argued that the massiveness and diversity of Russia favor trade 
integration via the WTO membership rather than through regional arrangements. Babecka-
Kucharcukova and Maurel (2004) found potential for trade increases between transition 
countries and EU countries at the eve of Russia’s accession to the WTO the through decline in 
the trade diversion effect, and institutional improvement. Khatibi (2008) also suggested 
institutional reforms along with the WTO accession as a long-term strategy Kazakhstan. 
Ukraine, which already joined the WTO in 2008 and opted for demand-based trade integration 
with the EU countries, would prefer to expand its integrated export potential with other CES 
countries in the mining, metallurgy, heavy engineering, aircraft and space industries (Konchyn, 
2006). The analysis of trade of another WTO member, Kyrgyzstan, shows that the WTO 
membership and liberal trade policy made the country’s bilateral trade grow and become more 
significant in the Central Asia (Kurmanalieva, 2008). 
Summarizing the existing literature, we suggest three drivers of international trade 
dynamics of the post-Soviet countries. The first one, the home bias effect, is a widely-discussed 
problem in macroeconomics and international finance. It was first documented by McCallum 
(1995) where he showed that, for the United States and Canada, inter-province trade is twenty 
times larger than international trade, holding other determinants of trade constant. The home 
bias in trade was later documented among the OECD countries (Helliwell, 1997). According to 
this theory, given the fact that the post-Soviet countries all inherited similar economic 
structures and are located far from the rest of the world, they should have traded more with 
each other. Persistent, though declining, intra-regional trade can be explained by this effect. 
Another effect is a holding together regionalism – a view that is defined as regional integration 
projects emerging in a group of countries, which have recently belonged to a single political 
entity and have intensive infrastructural, economic and social ties between each other (Libman 
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and Vinokurov, 2010).  Djankov and Freund (2000) empirically underpinned this idea by 
showing that the past linkages limit the reorientation of trade in the former Soviet states. The 
final effect postulates that trade patterns of landlocked countries are determined to a greater 
degree by their relationships with transit coastal neighbors (highlighted by Gallup et al, 1999, 
Limao and Venables, 2001, and Faye et al, 2004). In most countries landlocked-transit 
countries’ relations is a potential cause for holdup – opportunistic behavior by the transit 
country, which makes upstream countries poorer and less likely to invest in technology (Friberg 
and Tinn, 2009).  From this point of view, analysis of trade relations between coastal Russia and 
landlocked Central Asian states seem to be very interesting. To our knowledge, there is still no 
study that looks at the intra-regional trade of the post-Soviet region from the view of three 
explanations. In this paper we try to fill in this gap. 
 
III. Trade Patterns and Structure 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, independent countries have concluded dozens 
of regional trade agreements with the world and among each other, creating a spaghetti bowl 
of trade agreements, including the CIS, EurAsEC, CES, ECO, the Customs Union and bilateral 
agreements with the EU and each other. Such activity allowed to keep high volumes of 
international trade, but did not give rise to openness. The figure 1 below shows that trade 
openness of the region is well above the world average and fluctuates slightly below full GDP 
coverage. This number is lower than the average of developed countries, but much higher than 
the average of least developed countries.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Despite high growth in trade, the share of intra-regional trade in this region is low for all 
groupings (Figure 2). The main contributors to the regional trade are Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, which is indicated by a relatively high CES-4 intra-regional trade number (16%). 
Landlocked Central Asian states exhibit the lowest intra-regional trade among all groupings. 
Trade with Europe and Asia comprises about 90% of the post-Soviet countries’ trade, while only 
about 10% of trade deals are done with other continents. This can be well explained by the 
natural resource bias of the CIS trade structure and geographical proximity to the fast growing 
emerging markets: the demand for natural resources of CIS countries comes mostly from China 
and the European Union. 
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Figure 2 is about here 
 
Let us now look closer at the product structure of trade in the CIS.  The post-Soviet 
region trades about 10% with the rest of the world outside Eurasia. The structure is highly 
unbalanced with the highest share in mineral products (50%) and metals (13%).  Machinery and 
transportation equipment constitute only about 6% and agriculture only 4% in total trade value.  
However, intra-regional trade in the region looks more balanced and diversified. Although it 
comprises only 15% in total trade, half of that value goes to mineral products and metals, and 
the rest is divided between agriculture, machinery, manufacturing and other non-specified 
items.  
 
Figure 3 is about here 
 
The graphs in the Appendix show trade structure for different groupings in the CIS. The 
CES, which consists of the biggest four countries in the region, has trade structure very similar 
to the one in the CIS . EurAsEC-5 and EurAsEC-3 only have 9% of intra-regional trade and more 
concentration on natural resources outside the region, as well as within the region. With 82% in 
mineral products and metals, the Central Asian exports  are concentrated in raw materials. 
However, among each other the countries in the region also trade agricultural goods.   
 
IV. Home Bias, Holding Together, Holdup, and Regional Dummies 
 Gravity model has roots in Newton’s gravity law, which holds that gravitational force 
between two objects is positively related with their relative masses and negatively related with 
the distance between them.  The estimated model contains data for 162 countries over the 
period 1995-2008. Trade data come from IMF DOT Statistics database.  Zero-valued trade is 
omitted, since in this dataset missing trade means the absence of trade (Coe et al, 2002), and 
estimation is done on unbalanced panel dataset. All variables, excluding dummies, are in 
natural logarithms. Following Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), we allow for country and year 
heterogeneity, and use real values of variables (e.g. trade deflated by US CPI, real GDP). 
Following Carrere (2006), we chose Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimation technique, which allows 
fixing the omitted variables bias. As in Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), we allow for fixed time and 
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each country’s effect4. We add remoteness variable to control for the home bias effect, 
landlocked-transit dummy to control the holdup effect, and various interactions of 
infrastructure, cultural ties with regional dummies to control for the holding together effect. 
 First, we look at the interaction of RTA dummies and time dummies5 to see the 
evolution of integration processes for main trade groupings in the world and particularly within 
the post-Soviet states over the period of 1996-2008. Figure 4 demonstrates that Eurasia and its 
two main free trade frameworks, the EU and the ASEAN, demonstrate the increasing 
importance of intra-regional ties, while the importance of the CIS is declining and the WTO 
started growing at a slow pace since 2002. On the other hand, the regression results indicate 
that, unlike WTO members that trade 13% above the world average, the Eurasian countries 
trade 17% below the world average. Both coefficients present positive and statistically 
significant signs. Point estimate of -0.7 and -0.3 for the EU implies that when two countries of a 
pair belong to that grouping, they trade 50% [exp(-0.7)-1=-0.5] below the level that would other 
similar countries trade. Similarly, ASEAN countries trade 18-30% below the sample average.  
 
Figure 4 is about here 
 
  High positive coefficients in the regression results suggest that on average the CIS 
countries trade more than 4.5-10 times above the average in the sample. Other groupings that 
originated in the post-Soviet space follow a similar pattern, though mostly with statistically 
insignificant coefficients. The EurAsEC-3, a Customs Union of three countries, has larger but 
coefficient in regression but steeper decline over time than EurAsEC-5 and CES. EurAsEC-5 has a 
slower decline, which can be probably explained by a higher marginal effect of smaller 
countries in EurAsEC-56. CES dummy is somewhat close to EurAsEC-5. As to Central Asia, high 
and significant regression coefficients show that the region still trades almost 115 percent 
above the world average, but declining coefficients of interaction with time dummies suggest 
that the countries have been rapidly disintegrating over time. Landlocked nature and high 
dependence on natural resources of those countries suggest impossibility of increasing trade by 
creation of an agreement. 
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 Another variable that would show us the effect of home bias is relative remoteness. The 
first remoteness variable was proposed by Helliwell (1997) as separate variables for reporting 
and partner countries, and later utilized by Carrere (2006). The variable mirrors the fact that 
bilateral trade between countries is more likely when the average distance to all other trading 
partners is relatively high comparing to the distance between them. Putting it in a different 
way, “trade will be higher between country pairs that are far from the rest of the world than 
between country pairs that are close to the rest of the world” (Harrigan, 2002). We use the 
definition of remoteness introduced by Helliwell (1997) and commonly used in the gravity 
literature. Since we use bilateral trade flows, we use simple average between the two variables 
and divide it by their bilateral distance: 
ijt
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The results of remoteness variables estimations are similar to other estimations and in general 
support our expectations . The variable has a positive sign, as expected, and suggests that 1% of 
increase in the countries’ relative closeness results in 0.2-0.3% increase in trade. Almost similar 
results are derived for interaction of remoteness with the WTO member countries. However, 
interaction terms of remoteness with other Eurasian dummies, unfortunately, are in most cases 
not significant. This suggests that the geographical proximity make them already close enough 
to each other (high and significant RTA dummy effect).  
 The holding together variable is represented by interaction terms of infrastructure 
variable and RTA dummies. We use a standard specification of infrastructure by including index 
for the development of infrastructure, as was first suggested by Limao and Venables (2001). It is 
constructed as an average of the density of the road network, the paved road network, the rail 
network, and the number of main telephone lines per person.  For the world trade 
infrastructure this variable has a positive and significant sign. However, the marginal effect is 
very small, bringing about 0.004% of improvement in trade. Perhaps our variable does not 
capture cross-country infrastructure that is more important for trade rather than country-
specific infrastructure. Infrastructure variable is not significant for the CIS region, even though 
the variable has the expected positive sign.  
 Another variable that would represent a factor that may hold countries together is a 
common language dummy. In regression results it has an expected positive sign and suggests 
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that countries that speak same language tend to trade 50-60% above average. In the CIS it is 
EurAseEC-5 grouping that is still holding together in terms of speaking common language. 
 Finally, we test the holdup variable, which is taken from Friberg and Tinn (2009). It is 
defined as a dummy variable: 
 
country   transit a  pass  tohas  j and  ibetween    tradeif   1
j with  trade toifor  neededcountry  transit no if               0
ijHU  
This variable has the expected negative sign in almost  all estimations. For the world trade it 
suggests that trade which has to pass through a transit country is usually 20%  below the 
sample average, while for the WTO members this coefficient is slightly higher (25%). We also 
use an interaction of holdup (HU) dummy with RTA dummies.  Holdup dummy  exhibits 
different signs for various regions. In the CIS trade between transit and landlocked countries 
and among landlocked countries is 12% below the world average though the coefficient is not 
statistically significant and in the ASEAN region this number is even larger, 55%.   
 
 
V. Trade Potentials 
For estimation of potential trade we apply out-of-sample technique, when the gravity 
model is estimated on a sample that excludes the group of interest, and only the coefficients of 
estimated equations are applied for quantification of trade potential. 
It seems that home bias effects still have strong impact on the development of post-
Soviet integration that is mostly driven by inter-governmental agreements. Fidrmuc and 
Fidrmuc (2003) predicted potential trade 43 times lower than the actual among the former 
Soviet countries. Broadman (2005) found significant variation of potential trade among the CIS 
countries, with some of them significantly overtrading, like Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, some 
significantly undertrading, like Armenia and Georgia, while the biggest economies –Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan - trading as predicted.  
 
Figure 5 is about here 
 
Figure 5 is an additional evidence of findings of previous studies and our observations of 
the dominating home bias effect and holding together regionalism. All regional grouping in the 
CIS overtrade with each other with the highest overtrading coefficient for the EurAsEC-5 and 
EurAsEC-3. Together the CIS countries traded four times of their potential levels in 1995 and 
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now trade three times above the potential.  Four CES countries that have the highest share of 
intra-regional trade in the CIS have flatter reduction of actual trade and gradual approache 
their potential level. The steepest decline of the coefficient is observed for the Central Asian 
countries that traded six times above potential in 1995, and only three times in 2008.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The results of our exercise demonstrate that the CIS countries still highly overtrade with 
each other, even though the significance of home bias is decreasing over time.  The result of the 
significant coefficient of the holdup dummy provides additional evidence of the importance of 
cooperation between landlocked and transit countries in the region.  We could not find any 
evidence of the significant effect of similarity in infrastructure, which points at a cross-border 
infrastructure as a better determinant of trade. However, we believe that cross-border 
infrastructure, cultural ties and economic interdependence do have a significant impact on the 
presence of home bias.  
The findings point to the need for a comprehensive set of policies to enhance regional 
cooperation initiatives and mitigate the negative holdup effect in the post-Soviet space. Such a 
comprehensive response is particularly important in the view of current global imbalances and 
slowdown in global consensus. Increased resources and closer cooperation between 
government agencies and business associations are necessary features of policy 
implementations. This paper underlines the fact that gravity regression is an invaluable tool of 
empirical research to improve understanding of the effect of the RTAs. Widening the number of 
commodity groups and extending the scope of research would further deepen our insights. 
What is the next step for further integration in the CIS region after the creation of the 
Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus?  It seems that the bigger countries 
represent better candidates for initial integration steps, which was supported by a high share of 
intra-regional trade and slower decline in overtrading effect of the CES. Inclusion of another big 
country – Ukraine – is possibly the best candidate to join EurAsEC-3 and create of the core of 
post-Soviet integration. This core can subsequently grow and attract smaller countries that will 
have a larger marginal effect of integration.  
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VIII. Appendix 
 
Trading structure of regional groups in the CIS 
EurAsEC-5 
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Basics of Gravity Model 
Gravity model of international trade takes roots from Newton’s gravity equation, and 
relates the trade between a pair of countries to their economic mass, often measured by their 
respective GDPs, and the distance between them. It was brought into estimation of 
international trade by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963). Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand 
(1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Evenet and Keller (2002) developed theoretical 
justifications based on increasing returns to scale, imperfectly competitive markets and firm-
level product differentiation. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) improved empirical 
microfoundation of the gravity equation by introducing theoretical and practical way of 
derivation of a “multilateral resistance” term.  
A great volume of empirical literature use gravity equation for estimation of trade, 
investments and other bilateral transactions. The most notable estimations of bilateral trade 
flows are Frankel (1997) and Rose (2000). Egger (2002) suggested a correct way of controlling 
for heterogeneity in gravity equation on panel data and estimation of trade potentials. Finally, 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) sorted out the empirical specifications and use of dummy variables. 
We follow their specification as: 
GDP
j
j
GDP
i
i
ij
USA
ij
P
GDP
P
GDP
P
V
1   ,  where   otherstuffdistf ijij ,  
Despite recent suggestions of two-stage non-linear estimations (Helpman et al, 2008) 
we favor the Hausman-Taylor (Hausman-Taylor, 1981) estimation that became a widely 
accepted and standard technique for estimation of gravity model (Egger, 2002 and Carrere, 
2006)7. The Hausman-Taylor method allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables in trade 
projections and circumvents the problem of an ad hoc estimation of the country pair-specific 
dummy variable needed for a projection based on the fixed-effects estimator. In addition, it 
removes the correlation between the error term and included variables which often plagues 
random-effects estimation 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Helpman et al (2008) proposes treatment of zero-trade and asymmetric trade flows. But we still think that low 
trade volumes (no matter if unidirectional or two-way low volumes) signify low development of trade relations. 
Thus, treatment of multilateral resistance and unobserved effect seem to us more important 
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Data Definition and Sources 
Name Description Source 
Trade Log of bilateral trade (exports + imports) 
deflated by US CPI 
DOT Statistics, IMF and IFS, 
IMF 
Distance Log of great circle distance between capital 
cities 
 
Income Log of Product of Real GDPs WDI, World Bank 
Wage difference Log of Product of GDPs per capita WDI, World Bank 
Infrastructure Log  of simple average of Limao-Venables 
(2001) infrastructure variable 
WDI, World Bank 
Remoteness Log of simple average of remoteness variable WDI, World Bank  and 
distance 
Common border  1 if share common, 0 otherwise  CIA Fact book  
Common lanugage 1 if share common, 0 otherwise CIA Factbook 
HU dummy 1 if there is potential to holdup, and 0 
otherwise 
Landlocked – Transit countries 
from global map 
RTA dummy 1 for country pairs that belong to RTA, and 0 
otherwise 
Wikipedia 
Interaction variables RTA dummy multiplied by variable   
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Results of gravity equation 
VARIABLES FE RE HT HT HT HT HT HT HT
Distance 0.634*** -0.557*** -0.595*** -0.638*** -0.616*** -0.644*** -0.605*** -0.612*** -0.604***
[0.154] [0.144] [0.147] [0.147] [0.147] [0.147] [0.147] [0.147] [0.147]
GDP 0.367*** 0.398*** 0.395*** 0.383*** 0.399*** 0.383*** 0.398*** 0.384*** 0.399***
[0.045] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031]
GDP per capita -0.124*** -0.148*** -0.144*** -0.130*** -0.149*** -0.130*** -0.148*** -0.132*** -0.149***
[0.044] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030]
Common border 0.310*** 0.402*** 0.356*** 0.226*** 0.393*** 0.252*** 0.400*** 0.271*** 0.396***
[0.020] [0.069] [0.070] [0.068] [0.073] [0.069] [0.073] [0.069] [0.073]
Common language 0.530*** 0.590*** 0.601*** 0.518*** 0.587*** 0.533*** 0.603*** 0.525*** 0.602***
[0.021] [0.043] [0.044] [0.033] [0.044] [0.033] [0.043] [0.033] [0.043]
Remoteness 1.663*** 0.378*** 0.372** 0.266* 0.326** 0.267* 0.277* 0.267* 0.278*
[0.155] [0.144] [0.148] [0.148] [0.148] [0.148] [0.148] [0.148] [0.148]
Infrastructure 0.006* 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0 0.004*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Holdup -0.427*** -0.253*** -0.300*** -0.180*** -0.228*** -0.243*** -0.217*** -0.243*** -0.217***
[0.015] [0.033] [0.035] [0.029] [0.035] [0.029] [0.032] [0.029] [0.032]
WTO 0.200*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.061*** 0.130*** 0.065*** 0.129*** 0.065*** 0.129***
[0.030] [0.023] [0.023] [0.009] [0.023] [0.009] [0.023] [0.009] [0.023]
WTO-Remoteness1 1.539*** 0.367** 0.358** 0.330** 0.277* 0.273*
[0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
WTO-Infrastructure1 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
WTO-Language1 0.476** 0.498*** 0.513*** 0.502*** 0.516* 0.515***
[0.022] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035]
WTO-Holdup1 -0.306*** -0.319*** -0.366*** -0.309*** -0.296*** -0.296***
[0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Eurasia -0.305*** -0.188*** -0.231*** -0.193*** -0.241*** -0.203***
[0.031] [0.048] [0.049] [0.040] [0.050] [0.041]
Eurasia-Remoteness1 1.442*** 0.158 0.129 0.198
[0.009] [0.030] [0.030] [0.035]
Eurasia-Infrastructure1 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.003
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Eurasia-Language1 0.452*** 0.537*** 0.522*** 0.604***
[0.028] [0.096] [0.097] [0.107]
Eurasia-Holdup1 -0.245*** -0.122*** -0.113** 0.009
[0.014] [0.045] [0.046] [0.049]
ASEAN -0.390** 0.095 -0.405** 0.06 -0.378** 0.057
[0.160] [0.627] [0.162] [0.638] [0.162] [0.638]
ASEAN-Remoteness1 0.186 0.059 0.062
[0.290] [0.294] [0.294]
ASEAN-Infrastructure1 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
ASEAN-Language1 0.287 0.313 0.312
[0.555] [0.557] [0.557]
ASEAN-Holdup1 -0.862** -0.687 -0.47
[0.428] [0.435] [0.435]
SAARC -0.245 0.307
[0.286] [1.147]
SAARC-Remoteness1 0.368
[0.629]
SAARC-Infrastructure1 0.028
[0.032]
SAARC-Language1 -2.324**
[1.071]
SAARC-Holdup1 -0.234
[0.732]
EU -0.709*** -0.272 -0.706*** -0.328** -0.734*** -0.328**
[0.064] [0.166] [0.065] [0.167] [0.065] [0.167]
EU-Remoteness1 0.052 0.075 -0.073
[0.090] [0.088] [0.088]
EU-Infrastructure1 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
EU-Language1 -0.823*** -0.815*** -0.814***
[0.305] [0.295] [0.295]
EU-Holdup1 -0.086 0.124 0.124
[0.119] [0.116] [0.116]
CIS 1.709*** 2.373***
[0.126] [0.327]
CIS-Remoteness1 -0.020
[0.180]
CIS-Infrastructure1 0.007
[0.014]
CIS-Language1 0.180
[0.451]
CIS-Holdup1 -0.132
[0.284]
RIC -0.579 0.799
[0.512] [1.319]
RIC-Remoteness1 1.829
[1.995]
RIC-Infrastructure1 0.049
[0.079]
ECO 0.415** 0.975* 0.704*** 1.949*** 0.700*** 1.950***
[0.165] [0.540] [0.185] [0.610] [0.186] [0.610]
ECO-Remoteness1 0.106 -0.583 -0.860**
[0.277] [0.336] [0.336]
ECO-Infrastructure1 0.022 0.017 0.018
[0.021] [0.024] [0.024]
ECO-Language1 0.710
[1.145]
ECO-Holdup1 0.389 0.052 0.052
[0.378] [0.390] [0.390]
CES -0.046 0.07
[0.140] [0.851]
CES-Remoteness1 0.193
[0.265]
CES-Infrastructure1 0.006
[0.064]
CES-Language1 0.625
[0.441]
CES-Holdup1 0.029
[0.608]
EurAsEC-5 -0.02 0.031
[0.110] [0.476]
EurAsEC-5-Remoteness1 0.271
[0.116]
EurAsEC-5-Infrastructure1 -0.001
[0.040]
EurAsEC-5-Language1 0.522**
[0.250]
EurAsEC-5-Holdup1 -0.183
[0.403]
EurAsEC-3 0.313 0.68
[0.309] [0.795]
EurAsEC-3-Remoteness1 0.176
[0.430]
EurAsEC-3-Infrastructure1 0.035
[0.058]
Central Asia 0.767** 0.541 0.798** 0.541
[0.345] [1.487] [0.345] [1.484]
Central Asia - Remoteness1 0.912 0.914
[0.687] [0.687]
Central Asia - Infrastructure1 0.033 0.032
[0.042] [0.041]
Central Asia - Language1 -0.499 -0.542
[1.304] [1.293]
Constant -23.718*** -14.433*** -13.863*** -13.009*** -13.835*** -12.992*** -13.790*** -13.283*** -13.833***
[2.046] [1.858] [1.905] [1.892] [1.905] [1.898] [1.914] [1.898] [1.914]
Observations 118 415 118 415 118 415 118 415 118 415 118 415 118 415 118 415 118 415
R-squared 0.774 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909
Number of nol 10232 10232 10232 10232 10232 10232 10232 10232
Hausman -139.9 792.2 1701 1241 888.8 496.3 751.7 495.8  
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Figure 1: Dynamics of the CIS Trade Openness 100
GDP
ImportsExports
 
 
Source: WDI, World Bank 
 
 
Figure 2: Intra-regional Trade in the CIS: 2008 (in %) 
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Source: DOTS, IMF, authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 3: Structure of trade in the CIS: 2008 
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Source: TradeMap, WTC 
 
 
 
     
Figure 4: Evolution of RTA Dummies  
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Figure 5: Realization of Trade Potentials: actual trade over potential trade 
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